

# NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN 2018-2022

# DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION INDIA

## **Edition II, Revision 3**

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## **Foreword**

DGCA continues on its path of adopting risk based approach for the management of Aviation Safety in India. A milestone in this journey was the revision of State Safety Programme and accordingly State Safety Programme-India, Second Edition has been issued in June, 2021. To reflect on the new strategic initiative embodied in SSP –India Second Edition, the second issue of National Aviation Safety Plan (2018-2022) has been updated.

India is among one of the first countries in the world to have a State Safety Programme (SSP) consistent with ICAO requirements. The India's National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) incorporates the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) contained in RASP-APAC and is in line with ICAO's GASP.

The National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) sets out a continuous improvement strategy, which helps to achieve objectives of the State through implementation of effective safety oversight and State Safety Programme.

NASP recognizes that it is important for everyone in aviation to work closely and in a collaborative manner to identify safety risks and ensure that the most appropriate practices and technologies are adopted to address and reduce these risks.

I appreciate the sincere and tireless efforts of the DGCA Safety Team in managing the State Safety Programme and achieving this goal.

(Arun Kumar) Director General Civil Aviation

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## **Overview**

The National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) 2018-2022 is an outcome of some of the activities described in the State Safety Programme (SSP), experience gained in the implementation of State Safety Plan 2015-2017, evaluation of the performance of the safety priorities and work undertaken by the stakeholders in implementation and maintenance of their Safety Management System (SMS). It also incorporates the Global High Risk Categories (HRCs) of occurrences contained in the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and Regional HRCs contained in the Regional Aviation Safety Plan –Asia Pacific.

Based on the guidance provided in the National Aviation Safety Plan 2018-2022 Edition II, the Safety Performance Targets for the year 2020, 2021 & 2022 have been introduced in this issue of NASP as Revision 1.

DGCA is responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the NASP. It has been developed in partnership with the service providers and sets out the States Acceptable Level of Safety Performance.

DGCA website hosts the details of extent of aviation activity in India.

To meet the Safety Objectives and SPTs, it incorporates action plan with the sole aim of further improving safety across the civil aviation industry. The action plan also incorporates the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) contained in RASP-APAC.

## **Key Safety Priorities**

- Airborne Conflict
- Controlled Flight into Terrain
- Runway Excursions and Overruns
- Wildlife and Bird Strikes
- Loss of Control in-flight
- Runway Incursion and Ramp Safety
- Deficient Maintenance
- Aviation Procedures & Documentation

# **Acceptable Level of Safety Performance**

The Acceptable Level of Safety Performance (ALoSP) of India as defined in State Safety Programme, Second Edition is illustrated in figure 1.



Figure 1

# **Presentation of National Aviation Safety Plan**




Figure 2

# **State Safety Objectives & Safety Risk Controls**

Safety Objective (s) of Key Safety Priorities				
SO 1.1	Reduce the risk of airborne conflict			
SO 2.1	Reduce the risk of CFIT events			
SO 3.1	Reduce the number of runway excursions			
SO 4.1	Reduce the number of wildlife strikes (ground)			
SO 4.2	Reduce the number of bird strikes			
SO 5.1	Reduce the number of loss of control precursor events			
SO 6.1	Reduce the number of ground collisions between aircraft			
SO 6.2	Reduce the number of ground collisions between aircraft and vehicles			
SO 6.3	Reduce the number of ramp fatalities and serious injuries			
SO 6.4	Reduce the number of runway incursions			
SO 7.1	Improve the airworthiness of Indian registered passenger carrying aircraft (deficient maintenance)			
SO 8.1	Improvement in Regulatory Compliances related to Procedures and Documentation			
State Safety	State Safety Risk Controls			
SO 9.1	Establish and maintain an appropriate regulatory framework and approach to ensure effective oversight			
SO 9.2	Comply with international safety standards			
SO 9.3	Ensuring qualified and trained technical personnel			
SO 9.4	Prepare for the transition to a risk-based approach for regulatory oversight			
SO 9.5	All service providers that have completed the implementation of SMS (as a percent of the total number) i.e. scheduled operators, non-scheduled operators, MROs, aerodrome operators and ANS service providers			
SO 9.6	All other applicable service providers that have completed the implementation of SMS (as a percent of the total number) i.e. flying training and aircraft design & production organizations			
SO 9.7	Service providers to develop an appropriate organisation safety culture			
SO 9.8	To be able to effectively measure safety culture maturity			
SO 9.9	Sharing and exchange of safety information			

# **Summary of SPIs and SPTs**

SPI	Indicator	SPT 2020	SPT 2021	SPT 2022	
1. Air	1. Airborne Conflict				
1.1	Number of risk bearing AIRPROX per 10,00,000 flights over Indian airspace	1.69	1.64	1.59	
1.2	Number of TCAS RA in controlled airspace leading to breach of separation per 10,00,000 flight over Indian airspace	15.59	15.12	14.67	
1.3	Number of aircraft not or incorrectly complying with ATC instructions (including level bust) per 10,00,000 flights over Indian airspace	3.06	2.97	2.88	
1.4	Number of AIRPROX attributable to ATC/ system failure per 10,00,000 flights over Indian airspace	7.45	7.23	7.01	
1.5	Communication Errors				
2. Cor	ntrolled Flight into Terrain				
2.1	Number of GPWS/EGPWS warnings per 10,000 departures	3.02	2.93	2.84	
2.2	Number of helicopter VFR flights that make emergency landing due to degraded visual environment per 10,000 departures	1.40	1.44	1.49	
3. Rui	nway Excursions and Overruns				
3.1	Number of unstabilised approaches per 10,000 approaches				
3.2	Number of unstabilised approaches that continue to land per 10,000 approaches	6.06	5.88	5.70	
3.3	Number of unstabilised approaches when performing a precision approach per 10,000 approaches	3.21	3.12	3.02	
3.4	Number of unstabilised approaches when performing a non-precision approach (no vertical guidance) per 10,000 approaches	1.75	1.70	1.65	
3.5	Number of unstabilised approaches when performing a visual approach per 10,000 approaches	0.69	0.67	0.65	
3.6	Number of 'near' runway excursions per 10,000 approaches	0.01	0.01	0.01	
3.7	Number of runway excursions per 10,000 approaches	0.04	0.04	0.04	

SPI	Indicator	SPT 2020	SPT 2021	SPT 2022		
4. Wildlife and Bird Strikes						
4.1	Number of reported bird strikes at all Indian airports per 10,000 movements	4.53	4.39	4.26		
4.2	Number of reported wildlife strikes at all Indian airports per 10,000 movements	4.85	4.70	4.56		
4.3	Number of runway incursions by wildlife at all Indian airports per 10,000 movements	0.19	0.19	0.18		
5. Loss	of Control in-flight					
5.1	Loss of control precursor events per 10,000 departures:  • Actual stick-shaker/alpha floor  • Low speed during approach events					
5.2	Number of Laser interferences per 10,000 movements					
6. Run	way Incursion and ramp safety					
6.1	Number of runway incursions (aircraft) per 10,00,000 movements	7.25	7.03	6.82		
6.2	Number of runway incursions (vehicle) per 10,00,000 movements	0.38	0.37	0.36		
6.3	Number of runway incursions (person) per 10,00,000 movements	1.52	1.48	1.43		
6.4	Number of runway incursion incidents involving loss of situational awareness by pilots, non-familiarization with aerodrome layout, distraction per 10,00,000 movements	1.89	1.83	1.78		
6.5	Number of ramp incidents that result in damage to aircraft, vehicles or loss of life/serious injury to personnel per 10,00,000 movements	22.92	22.23	21.57		
7. Defi	cient Maintenance					
7.1	Incident involving component/system failure per 10,000 flight hours	2.10	2.04	1.98		
7.2	Number of maintenance errors per 10,000 flight hours	1.39	1.35	1.31		

SPI	Indicator	SPT 2020	SPT 2021	SPT 2022
8. Avia	8. Aviation Procedures & Documentation			
8.1	Regulatory audit findings related to procedures (measured in terms of percentage of total findings)	35.89%	34.81%	33.77%
8.2	Regulatory audit findings related to workplace Manual (measured in terms of percentage of total findings)	28.13%	27.29%	26.47%
8.3	Regulatory audit findings related to documentation (measured in terms of percentage of total findings)	9.13%	8.85%	8.59%

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# **Safety Context**

## 1.1 State Safety Programme

The Indian State Safety Programme (SSP) was initially published in November 2010. To capture the changes in Civil Aviation System in India, primary aviation legislation, specific operating regulations, SARPs contained in ICAO Annex 19 Second Edition and Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) 2020-22, the Indian State Safety Programme (SSP), Second Edition has been published in June 2021. The SSP is an integrated set of regulations and activities describing as to how India manages and seeks the continuous improvement in aviation safety. The SSP recognises that States as well as service providers have safety responsibilities and provides a framework for all stakeholders to work together.

In compliance with the State Safety Programme, State Safety Plan 2015-2016 was developed, which extended for the year 2017. The performance of each of the State Safety Priorities has been analysed, and captured in Annual Safety Review 2016 and 2017. This has provided inputs for developing the National Aviation Safety Plan 2018-2022.

## 1.2 Safety Management System

Safety management principles provide a platform for parallel development of the SSP by the State and the SMS by its service providers. In developing the State Safety Legislative Framework, India has promulgated SMS requirements requiring that service providers implement their safety management capabilities allowing for the effective identification of systemic safety deficiencies and the resolution of safety concerns.

SMS is largely a performance-based system requiring the appropriate exchange of safety information with internal and external stakeholders. The State, through its SSP functions, provides both the oversight functions and facilitates implementation of appropriate data aggregation and information sharing initiatives.

## 1.3 Safety Performance Indicators and Safety Performance Targets

Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) are tactical monitoring and measurement tools of the State's safety performance. During the initial development and implementation of the SSP, the level of safety performance is normally represented by Safety Performance Indicators related to high consequence outcomes (such as accident and serious incident rates) and high-level system assessment outcomes (such as effective implementation of ICAO SARPs). As the SSP matures, the level of safety performance can be complemented by indicators representing lower consequence system outcomes or deviation events. Safety Performance Indicators are generally monitored using basic quantitative data trending tools that generate graphs or charts and incorporate alert/target levels commonly used in technical, quality or reliability control systems.

Safety Performance Targets (SPTs) define short-term and medium-term safety performance management desired achievements. They act as "milestones" that provide confidence that the organization is on track to achieving its safety objectives and provide a measurable way of verifying the effectiveness of safety performance management activities.

## 1.4 National Aviation Safety Plan 2018-2022

The National Aviation Safety Plan 2018-2022 is an outcome of some of the activities described in the State Safety Programme (SSP), experience gained in the implementation of State Safety Plan 2015-2017, evaluation of the performance of the safety priorities and the work undertaken by stakeholders in implementation and maintenance of their Safety Management System (SMS).

SARPs as contained in ICAO Annex 19, Edition II requires that the States shall establish the acceptable level of safety performance to be achieved through their SSP. It further provides guidance that –

"An Acceptable Level of Safety Performance (ALoSP) for the State can be achieved through the implementation and maintenance of the SSP as well as Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) and Safety Performance Targets (SPTs) showing that safety is effectively managed and built on the foundation of implementation of existing safety-related."

## 1.5 India Acceptable Level of Safety Performance

- (a) No fatal accidents in Commercial Aircraft Operation
- (b) Effective implementation of SPIs and achievement of SPTs
- (c) Enhancement of Safety Oversight capability to achieve at least 85% effective implementation

## 1.6 Establishing Safety Performance Targets

The desired safety outcome is to reduce number of reported events for each SPI by 3% every year taking into consideration the performance of previous year.

# **Safety Focus**

## 2.1 State Safety Priorities


Based on the Global HRCs, Regional HRCs and using our own experience, supported by data from the State Safety Database, the DGCA is targeting eight State Safety Priorities. These are:

- Airborne Conflict
- Controlled Flight into Terrain
- Runway Excursions and Overruns
- Wildlife and Bird Strikes
- Loss of Control in-flight
- Runway Incursion and Ramp Safety
- Deficient Maintenance
- Aviation Procedures & Documentation

These will provide a focus for the DGCA and the wider-aviation community for the year 2018 to 2022.

For each State Safety Priority, we have developed safety objectives, desired safety outcome, developed safety action plan and a number of Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs).

The SPIs have been identified as per the applicable stakeholder as illustrated in figure 3:




These are explained in more detail in Sections 3, 4 and 5.

## 2.2 Monitoring Effectiveness of Safety Risk Controls

In addition to focusing on State Safety Priorities, it is important that the effectiveness of key State Safety risk controls is measured and continuously improved. The focus for the years 2018 to 2022 will be on ensuring the following:

- *Effective State safety oversight;*
- Implementation of service providers' Safety Management System;
- Implementation of recommendations emanating from accidents, serious incidents, incidents and AIRPROX events;
- Progressive adoption of aviation safety culture;
- Addressing significant safety concerns raised by ICAO and implementation of other ICAO provision; and
- Safe operations of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS).

# **State Safety Priorities**



## **SP1: Airborne Conflict**

Whilst technology has helped reduce the number of actual airborne collisions, even a single event can cause huge loss of life. This undermines confidence in Indian Aviation and, in turn, will impact the Indian economy as a whole.

**Table 3.1-SP1 Safety Measures Already in Place** 

DGCA References	Safety Measures Already in Place
CAR Section 2, Series I, Part VIII	ACAS is mandatory for all operators operating air transport services to, through within and over flying Indian airspace
Operations Circular 07 of 2010	Guidance material published on ACAS performance based training
Operations Circular 07 of 2010	Promotion of the use of simulators and interactive CBT for ACAS training
AIC 02 of 2017	Guidelines on Avoiding Confusing/Similar Call-Signs by Airline Operators

The safety objective (SO 1.1) is to reduce the risk of airborne conflict occurring through tracking and actively managing events that can lead to a collision.

## **Safety Action Plan:**

**Table 3.2-SP1 Safety Objectives** 

Safety objective(s)	Action	Stakeholder(s)
SO 1.1: Reduce the risk of airborne conflict	<ul> <li>a. All air operators shall provide training to relevant staff that includes:</li> <li>i. Detailed classroom sessions on TCAS including limitations of RA for the pilots and ATCOs</li> <li>ii. CRM training for pilots with specific emphasis on situational awareness with respect to traffic</li> <li>iii. Ensuring understanding of the guidelines issued for ACAS command during recurrent training of pilots.</li> <li>iv. Procedure to be reviewed for critical airspace wherein the maximum number of TCAS-RA are being reported</li> <li>v. Follow standard departure, arrival and route procedures</li> <li>b. Regular proficiency check and structured refreshers for ATCOs</li> </ul>	<ol> <li>Air Operators</li> <li>ANS Provider</li> </ol>

The effectiveness of actions will be assessed by tracking the following SPIs:

Table 3.3-SP1 SPIs

SPI	Metrics	Stakeholder
1.1	Number of risk bearing AIRPROX per 10,00,000 flights over Indian airspace	ANSP & CAO
1.2	Number of TCAS RA in controlled airspace leading to breach of separation per 10,00,000 flight over Indian airspace	CAO
1.3	Number of aircraft not or incorrectly complying with ATC instructions (including level bust) per 10,00,000 flights over Indian airspace	ANSP
1.4	Number of AIRPROX attributable to ATC/system failure per 10,00,000 flights over Indian airspace	ANSP
1.5	Communication Errors	CAO, CHO, ANSP

Note: Risk Bearing AIRPROX: Category A & B as per Air Safety Circular 05 of 2009.



## **SP2:** Controlled Flight into Terrain

Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) events are one of the most common causes of accidents. Whilst technology has made certain amount of intervention, however, this is still a key area of concern for scheduled, non-scheduled fixed-wing and helicopter operations.

CFIT accidents are caused due to lack of flight crew vertical/horizontal position awareness in relation to ground, water or obstacle. More than two-thirds of all CFIT accidents have occurred due to the result of altitude error or lack of vertical situational awareness. The CFIT accidents also occur during reduced visibility associated with instrument meteorological conditions, darkness or a combination of both the conditions.

MSAWS alerts the air traffic controller with both visual and aural alarms when an airplane penetrates, or is predicted to penetrate, a predetermined MSA in the protected terminal area. The GPWS warning is normally the flight crew's last opportunity to avoid CFIT. Incidents and accidents have occurred because flight crew have failed to make timely and corrective action in response to the GPWS warnings.

**Table 3.4-SP2 Safety Measures Already in Place** 

DGCA References	Safety Measures Already in Place		
CAR Section 2, Series I, Part VII	Implementation of ICAO Standards for installation of GPWS equipment		
Operations Circular 02 of 2017	Guidance on training programme on use of GPWS		
Operations Circular 09 of 2017	Approach and Landing Accidents Reduction (ALAR) and Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) reduction tool kit		
Air Safety Circular 09 of 2013	Non-punitive policy towards helicopter pilots who decided to abort the mission and carryout safe forced landing due to deteriorating weather conditions		

The safety objective (SO 2.1) is to further reduce the risk of CFIT events occurring through tracking and actively managing events that can lead to a collision.

## **Safety Action Plan:**

**Table 3.5-SP2 Safety Objective** 


Safety objective(s)	Action	Stakeholder(s)
SO 2.1: Reduce	a. Emphasize, monitor and enforce pilots to carry out instrument	1. Air Operators
the risk of CFIT	approaches, follow all stabilized approach criteria and SOPs	2. Indian MET
events	for approach and landing	Dept.
	b. CFIT awareness programmes, through ALAR Tool Kit and	•
	training films with correlation of similar incidents	
	c. Training modules covering situational awareness mainly on	
	changeover from auto flight to manual flight, standard	

Safety objective(s)	Action	Stakeholder(s)
	phraseology, adherence to checklists, altimeter settings and availability of serviceable landing aids, terrain specific warnings e.g. EGPWS/GPWS  d. Analysis and follow-up of EGPWS events e. Assessments during Line checks f. Helicopter operations, provision for improved MET forecast even at uncontrolled airfields g. Strict monitoring and enforcement of MET minima	

The effectiveness of actions will be assessed by tracking the following SPIs:

Table 3.6-SP2 SPIs

SPI	Metrics	Stakeholder
2.1	Number of GPWS/EGPWS warnings per 10,000 departures	CAO, CHO
2.2	Number of helicopter VFR flights that make emergency landing due to degraded visual environment per 10,000 departures	СНО



## **SP3: Runway Excursions and Overruns**

Globally, runway excursions and overruns are the cause of more accidents and serious incidents than any other single cause. Both remain a significant problem in India, particularly during the monsoon season.

Table 3.7-SP3 Safety Measures Already in Place

DGCA References	Safety Measures Already in Place
CAR Section 2, Series I, Part VII	Implementation of ICAO Standards for installation of GPWS equipment
Operations Circular 01 of 2013	Non-punitive policy towards pilots who decide to go around
Operations Circular 03 of 2014	Guidance on all weather operations training programme
Operations Circular 03 of 2017	Guidance on unstable approaches
Operations Circular 09 of 2017	Approach and Landing Accidents Reduction (ALAR) and Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) reduction tool kit
Air Safety Circular 02 of 2017	Guidance on procedures to be followed during non-availability of RESA
CAR Section 4, Series B, Part I	Guidance on RESA has been included
CAR Section 8, Series C, Part I	All Weather Operations

The safety objective (SO 3.1) is to reduce number of runway excursions at all India airports and at all times of the year.

## **Safety Action Plan:**

**Table 3.8-SP3 Safety Objective** 

Safety	Action	Stakeholder(s)
objective(s)		
SO3.1:	a. All air operators shall provide a training module to includes:	Air Operators
Reduce the	i. CRM class:	
number	<ul> <li>Increased emphasis on coordination between two pilots</li> </ul>	
of runway	with respect to traffic clearances given by ATC	
excursions	ii. Flight Safety Class:	
	<ul> <li>Causes of runway excursions</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Increased emphasis on situational awareness with respect to traffic on approach/departures/taxiing on</li> </ul>	
	runways	
	iii. Simulator training:	
	<ul> <li>On performance limited airfields</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Stabilized approaches</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Training on cross-wind landings to a level required for operations</li> </ul>	
	b. Continuous periodic monitoring through route/ in-flight	

Safety objective(s)	Action	Stakeholder(s)
	checks  c. FOQA monitoring of landings made beyond the touchdown zone of the runway (Extended/long flare).  d. In case of non-precision approach, the operators are encouraged to carryout Continuous Descent Final Approach Technique (CDFA)  Specialized ALAR Tool Kit training on visual illusion faced while transitioning to visual segment of approach	

The effectiveness of actions will be assessed by tracking the following SPIs:

Table 3.9-SP3 SPIs

SPI	Metrics	Stakeholder
3.1	Number of unstabilised approaches per 10,000 approaches	CAO
3.2	Number of unstabilised approaches that continue to land per 10,000 approaches	CAO
3.3	Number of unstabilised approaches when performing a precision approach per 10,000 approaches	CAO
3.4	Number of unstabilised approaches when performing a non-precision approach (no vertical guidance) per 10,000 approaches	CAO
3.5	Number of unstabilised approaches when performing a visual approach per 10,000 approaches	CAO
3.6	Number of 'near' runway excursions per 10,000 approaches	AERD, CAO
3.7	Number of runway excursions per 10,000 approaches	AERD, CAO

## Note:

<sup>&#</sup>x27;Near' Runway Excursion is an occurrence where aircraft is not able to maintain the directional stability on the runway which may result in damage to the runway edge/end lights. However, aircraft continues to remain on the paved surface.



## **SP4: Wildlife and Bird Strikes**

Wildlife and bird strikes pose a significant threat to flight safety and have caused a number of accidents, including incidents in India. Most incidents occur at the critical phase of flight resulting into structural damage, as well as damage to aircraft systems. As such, both wildlife and bird strikes remain a major focus for the DGCA.

**Table 3.10-SP4 Safety Measures Already in Place** 

DGCA References	Safety Measures Already in Place
a. Order No. AV-15023/1/2009-AS (NBCC) dated 02.12.2013	National Bird Control Committee
b. Revised order dated 20.04.2017	Transfer Bru Control Committee
Ministry of Home Affairs Letter No. 53/1/80-	Airfield Environment Management
Public dated 07.05.1980	Committees
Rule 91, Aircraft Rules 1937	Primary legislation (Aircraft Rules) preventing dumping of garbage and de-skinning of animals within a 10 km radius around airport
Recommendation of NBCC	Education and outreach programmes
Recommendation of NBCC	Extensive audits and inspections
Air Safety Circular 02 of 2011	Comprehensive data collection activities
Aerodrome Circular 06 of 2017	Guidance on Wildlife Hazard Management

The safety objectives (SO 4.1 and 4.2) are to reduce the number of wildlife and bird strike events at Indian airports.

## **Safety Action Plan:**

**Table 3.11-SP4 Safety Objectives** 

Safety	Action	Stakeholder(s)
objective(s)		
objective(s) SO4.1: Reduce the number of wildlife strikes (ground) SO4.2: Reduce the number of bird strikes	<ul> <li>a. Reiterate generation of pilot reports on wildlife sighting</li> <li>b. Awareness campaign in localities and schools regarding wildlife hazards</li> <li>c. Dedicated team managed by trained staff to ensure implementation of wildlife strike control measures</li> <li>d. Review of existing mitigation action and identify the areas of improvement with airport management</li> <li>e. Appraise administration of all the State Government, through communication to the Chief Secretaries of the States on the importance of compliance of Rule 91 of the Aircraft Rules 1937</li> <li>f. Instruct management of all airports to take effective steps for mitigation of wildlife hazard</li> </ul>	Air Operators     Aerodrome     Operators
	g. Detailed study of the wildlife species around the airport.	
	h. Adoption of Habitat Management Strategies	

## Implementation of this Safety Action Plan is a continuous process.

The effectiveness of actions will be assessed by tracking the following SPIs:

Table 3.12-SP4 SPIs

SPI	Metrics	Stakeholders
4.1	Number of reported bird strikes at all Indian airports per 10,000 movements	ANSP, AERD, CAO, CHO
4.2	Number of reported wildlife strikes at all Indian airports per 10,000 movements	ANSP, AERD, CAO, CHO
4.3	Number of runway incursions by animal at all Indian airport per 10,000 movements	ANSP, AERD, CAO, CHO



## **SP5:** Loss of Control in Flight

Loss of control can be caused by many events, such as system or component failure, aircraft damage or even severe weather. However, the most significant secondary cause of accidents resulting from a loss of control relates to 'control upset' either induced by the pilot and/or when operating at low altitude, such as final approach and landing.

Table 3.13-SP5 Safety Measures Already in Place

DGCA References	Safety Measures Already in Place
Operations Circular 03 of 2011	Guidance material for training of pilots in high altitude and high speed flights
CAR Section 5, Series F, Part-II	100% Flight Data Monitoring by the operators
CAR Section 8 Series H Part II	Flight Crew Training and Qualification Requirements for Commercial Helicopter Operations

The safety objective (SO5.1) is to reduce the number of loss of control pre-cursor events.

## **Safety Action Plan:**

Table 3.14-SP5 Safety Objective

Safety objective(s)	Action	Stakeholder(s)
· ·	<ul> <li>a. All air operators shall provide a training module (i.e. initial and recurrent) to include: <ol> <li>Upset recovery and preventive training</li> <li>Assessment/detection of wind shear</li> <li>Practice of stall recovery in landing configuration during approach with emphasis on speed control and thrust management (simulator training)</li> <li>Training for high altitude operation including speed management, knowledge of buffet margins, high altitude stall recovery</li> </ol> </li> <li>Emphasis on stablised approaches</li> <li>Laying down max. bank angle limits, monitoring of EGPWS call-outs in SSFDR and subsequent analysis of bank angle exceedances</li> </ul>	Air Operators
	d. SOP to deal with windshear during take-off and landing	
	e. Training of helicopter pilots on condition leading to IIMC, immediate actions on encountering IIMC and subsequent action for its safe recovery	
	f. Helicopter operators are required to follow SOPs/ limitation of RFM specially operating when engaged in off-shore/hill operations	

The effectiveness of actions will be assessed by tracking the following SPIs:

Table 3.15-SP5 SPIs

SPI	Metrics	Stakeholder
5.1	<ul> <li>Loss of control precursor events per 10,000 departures:</li> <li>Actual stick-shaker and alpha floor</li> <li>Low speed during approach events</li> <li>Low speed during cruise events</li> <li>Bank angle exceeding (maximum permitted) as per AFM for aircraft type</li> <li>Windshear below 500 feet</li> </ul>	CAO
5.2	Laser interference	CAO, CHO, ANSP

 $\underline{Note} \colon \ Low \ speed \ during \ approach \ event \colon V_{APP} - 5 \ knots \ at \ 100 \ feet$ 



## **SP6: Runway Incursion and Ramp Safety**

Ground collisions also result into numerous serious incidents. There was one reported fatality and numerous injuries in 2013, as such this remains one of the DGCA's safety priorities.

**Table 3.16-SP6 Safety Measures Already in Place** 

DGCA References	Safety Measures Already in Place
CAR Section 4, Series X, Part I	Runway safety Programme and formation of Runway Safety Team
Air Safety Circular 04 of 2007	Guidance material issued for safety on the apron
Aerodrome Advisory Circular 04 of 2017	Guidance on establishment of Apron Management Service at an aerodrome
CAR Section 4, Series B, Part I	Aerodrome Design and Operations- Guidance on installation of Stop Bars

The safety objectives (SO 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4) are to reduce the number of ground collisions between aircraft, ground collisions between vehicles and aircraft, the number of fatalities and serious injuries occurring on the ramp and runway incursions.

## **Safety Action Plan:**

**Table 3.17-SP6 Safety Objectives** 

Safety objective(s)	Action	Stakeholder(s)
SO6.1: Reduce the number of ground collisions between	a. Airlines and airport operators shall ensure training of vehicle drivers to follow speed control and know the sensitive areas	1. Air Operators
aircraft	b. Airport operators shall introduce and ensure the effective utilization of ATC ground surveillance at	2. Airport Operators
SO6.2: Reduce the number of ground collisions between aircraft and vehicles	all high density airports  c. Airport operators shall introduce training to ATCOs on prevention of runway incursions	3. ANS Providers
SO6.3: Reduce the number of ramp fatalities and serious	<ul> <li>d. Improved signage in accordance with ICAO SARPs</li> <li>e. Airport operators shall introduce Breathe Analyzer tests for all drivers &amp; equipment operators on airport premises</li> </ul>	
injuries	f. Operators shall review existing taxing and towing procedures and update them to include:	
SO6.4 Reduce the number of runway incursions	<ul> <li>Adherence to SOPs on ramp</li> <li>Adherence to SOPs for towing/taxiing</li> <li>Utilization of wing walkers during pushback/taxi in/out</li> </ul>	

Safety objective(s)	Action	Stakeholder(s)
	<ul> <li>g. All air operators shall develop training program to include:</li> <li>Understanding the importance of signages, marking and lighting</li> <li>Familiarization with operating aerodrome layout and taxi procedures specific to the aerodromes</li> <li>Increased alertness levels amongst crew while taxiing</li> <li>Following correct taxiways and speed limits</li> <li>Clear and unambiguous RT between aircraft and ATC</li> <li>Meticulous adherence to ground markings and awareness of works in progress at an airfield</li> <li>Intermediate holding position marking and lights at all high density airports</li> <li>All airport operators shall develop and introduce procedures to significantly reduce vehicular movements on the maneuvering area during LVP/bad weather</li> <li>J. All airport operators shall provide stop bars at airports with high intensity operations.</li> </ul>	

The effectiveness of actions will be assessed by tracking the following SPIs:

Table 3.18-SP6 SPIs

SPI	Metrics	Stakeholders
6.1	Number of runway incursions (aircraft) per 10,00,000 movements	ANSP, AERD, CAO, CHO
6.2	Number of runway incursions (vehicle) per 10,00,000 movements	ANSP, AERD
6.3	Number of runway incursions (person) per 10,00,000 movements	ANSP, AERD
6.4	Number of runway incursion incidents involving loss of situational awareness by pilots, non-familiarization with aerodrome layout, distraction per 10,00,000 movements	САО, СНО
6.5	Number of ramp incidents that result in damage to aircraft, vehicles or loss of life/ serious injury to personnel per 10,00,000 movements	CAO, CHO, AERD



## **SP7: Deficient Maintenance**

There are currently a large proportion of incidents that occur as a result of component failure. Understanding and addressing these is a key safety priority during this period.

**Table 3.19-SP7 Safety Measures Already in Place** 

DGCA References	Safety Measures Already in Place
CAD M % CAD 145	Component failure
CAR M & CAR 145	Maintenance errors

The safety objective (SO 7.1) is to improve the maintenance of Indian registered passenger carrying aircraft, thereby reducing the number of incidents relating to maintenance issues.

## **Safety Action Plan:**

**Table 3.20-SP7 Safety Objective** 

Safety objective(s)	Action	Stakeholder(s)
SO 7.1: Improve the airworthiness	a. Review of qualifying requirements for licensing of technical personnel due to advancement of	1. DGCA
of Indian	technology	2. Air Operators
registered passenger carrying aircraft	b. DGCA, with the support of relevant service providers, shall develop programmes to encourage voluntary reporting in technical work through a non-punitive approach	-
	c. Integration of avionic system training along with other airframe/ engine system	
	d. Improve the qualifying requirement of senior technicians	

The effectiveness of actions will be assessed by tracking the following SPIs:

Table 3.21-SP7 SPIs

SPI	Metrics	Stakeholder
7.1	Incident involving component/system failure per 10,000 flight hours	CAO and CHO
7.2	Number of Maintenance errors per 10,000 flight hours	CAO, CHO MRO

Note: The maintenance errors may include the following:

- i) Failure to follow published technical data or local instructions
- ii) Using unauthorized procedure not referenced in technical data
- iii) Supervisors accepting non-use of technical data or failure to follow maintenance instructions
- iv) Failure to document maintenance properly in maintenance records, work package
- v) Inadequate/unrecognised maintenance
- vi) Incorrectly installed hardware on an aircraft/engine
- vii) Performing an unauthorized modification to the aircraft
- viii) Failure to conduct a tool inventory after completion of the task
- ix) Personnel not trained or certified to perform the task
- x) Ground support equipment improperly positioned for the task



## **SP8: Aviation Procedures & Documentation**

DGCA prepares Annual Surveillance Programme (ASP) based on experience gained during the past years comprising of safety oversight plan of all Directorates. The respective directorate carry out the audits and the surveillance activities as per plan. In the years 2016 and 2017, regulatory audits of various air operators carried out revealed the major deficiencies in the area of procedures, documentation and workplace manuals which almost contributed to the an average of 70% of the regulatory audit findings. Based on the data analyzed for two consecutive years, DGCA India has introduced a new State priority on the Aviation Procedures & Documentation.

**Table 3.22-SP7 Safety Measures Already in Place** 

DGCA References	Safety Measures Already in Place
Civil Aviation requirements and Circulars	Regulations and guidance related to development and establishment of procedures, manual, documentation related to aviation are elaborately given in relevant CARs, Circulars, etc.

The safety objective (SO8.1) is to improve the regulatory compliances related to Procedures and Documentation amongst aviation service providers for ensuring safe operations.

## **Safety Action Plan:**

Table 3.23-SP8 Safety Objective

Safety objective(s)	Action	Stakeholder(s)
SO8.1:	1. Monitoring on Regulatory Documents on related	Air Operators
Improvement in	websites to be current with new updates	
regulatory	2. Proper dissemination of information gathered to the	
compliances	concerned departments and affected personnel	
related to	3. Proper maintenance of data and records	
Procedures and	4. Conduct internal surveys to check on the	
Documentation	effectiveness of the above action points	

The effectiveness of actions will be assessed by tracking the following SPIs:

Table 3.24-SP8 SPIs

SPI	Metrics	Stakeholder
8.1	Regulatory audit findings related to Procedures (measured in terms of percentage of total findings)	DGCA
8.2	Regulatory audit findings related to Workplace Manual (measured in terms of percentage of total findings)	
8.3	Regulatory audit findings related to Documentation (measured in terms of percentage of total findings)	

Note: Description of the events involved in the above mentioned factors are as follows:

- 1. **Procedure:** Non-compliance of agreed/ approved procedure by responsible person/ organization, system not established as per requirement, etc.
- 2. **Workplace manual:** Includes all manuals, procedure/SOPs/Manuals/ documents out of date/obsolete, procedure poorly defined, manual/ documents not easily available, etc.
- 3. **Documentation:** Lack of training records, safety surveys, etc.

# **Emerging Safety Issues**

In addition to the State Safety Priorities, this chapter addresses emerging safety issues as well as issues that could potentially emerge in the immediate or near future. The safety issues detailed are driven from operations or regulations that have not been fully deployed, and it provides a future platform for National Aviation Safety Plan.

### 4.1 Civil Drones (Unmanned Aircraft Systems)



### **Current Status**

DGCA India has recently published Drone Rules, 2021. India is expected to have huge number of RPAS in near future. Industries such as agriculture, construction, surveying, roads, railway, mining, aerial filming, forest and environment study, etc. would be stimulated to a great extent.

An Online/ web based single window system 'Digital Sky' for issue of Unique Identification Number (UIN) of RPAS is available on DGCA website.

### **Way Forward**

- DGCA to monitor the effectivity of the published operating regulations in respect of RPAS.
- DGCA to coordinate with other agencies for safe and smooth operations of RPAS in the country.
- Harmonized regulations for RPAS around the globe are required. Evidently, RPAS has
  huge potential to help create jobs, increase skill base and increase the efficiency of
  industries across the country and worldwide. This will also boost industries associated in
  the development of this technology. However, the need of the hour is to facilitate RPAS
  market with globally harmonized regulations even for small RPAS.

### 4.2 Emerging SPI in Airborne Conflict

### **4.2.1 Communication Errors**



### **Current Status**

There are large number of incidents occurred in the recent past which have been attributed to improper communication or miscommunication between air traffic controllers and pilots such as, incorrect phraseologies, inappropriate use of plain English, absence of read-back or absence of correction or acknowledgement to read-back, pilot's/controller's

complacency, selective hearing and hearing expectancy.

These errors come to the notice only during the investigation of incidents. However there is a possibility that the number of communication errors taking place, which have not resulted in any incidents, would go unnoticed.

### Way Forward

As a preventive measure, DGCA has asked AAI to maintain database of such communication errors through voluntary reporting system so that necessary action may be taken to prevent such errors in future. Voluntary reporting of such errors which do not result in any incident should be treated as non-punitive so that pilots & controllers may report fearlessly and freely.

### 4.3 Emerging SPI in Loss of Control in-flight

### 4.3.1 Laser Interferences

Cases where laser interference was perpetrated in India or where laser interference perpetrated against an Indian aircraft abroad was reported.



### **Current Status**

A total of 39 (i.e. 0.16 per 10000 movements) cases of laser interferences were reported in the year 2017 at major cities (Delhi and Mumbai) during landing and take-off. DGCA has issued Civil Aviation Requirements on Laser emissions which may endanger the safety of aircraft.

### Way Forward

- Aiming a laser at an aircraft, especially during approach and landing, may blind the flight crew and lead to a loss of control during a critical phase of flight, potentially causing a serious incident/accident. Public awareness is essential for preventing the occurrence of such incidents.
- For further development of safety risk control in this aspect, it is required to monitor the emerging seriousness of this issue. All aerodrome operators need to maintain and report the data of such laser interferences.

### 4.4 Emerging threat in Ground Handling Services



Ground handling activities include ground handling personnel, use of vehicles & GSEs, aircraft refueling, removal of FOD, restricted dangerous goods etc. They help in running commercial flight operations smoothly, and also play a major role in flight safety. Personnel/operators on ground in the Aircraft Restricted Area are in a better position to detect damages/leaks etc. on the aircraft because of their close vicinity to the

aircraft till it departs.

### **Current Status**

DGCA through its CAR Section 1 Series C Part 1 on "Safety Management System" mandates implementation of SMS among sub-contractors through interface management. DGCA fixes the responsibility of oversight of implementation of SMS among sub-contractors i.e. ground handling agencies on aircraft operators.

### **Way Forward**

Safety management of ground handling is one of the issues that still needs follow-up. It is essential to encourage safety reporting among the ground handlers to identify the serious threats to aircraft on ground. Based on the data analyzed, the following areas need attention with regard to ground handling:

- Reporting of hazards an threats in ground handling;
- Promotion of the safety culture;
- Implementation of the safety management system;
- Effective oversight on Ground handling agencies

### 4.5 Application of safety management principles to the medical assessment process

### 4.5.1 In-flight Crew Incapacitation

Crew incapacitation in critical phase of flight poses a potential hazard. There could be total incapacitation or partial incapacitation. Collection of epidemiological data will facilitate in development of proactive strategies through predictive analysis of this data.

### **Current Status**

DGCA through its CAR Section 5 Series C Part I and CAR Section 7 Series C Part I mandates reporting of in-flight crew incapacitation to DGCA by the service provider. All such cases are investigated and crew are subjected to detailed medical assessment.

### **Way Forward**

Establishment of database for predictive analysis

### 4.5.2 Medical risk identification

- a) Continuous re-evaluation of the medical assessments issued by DGCA for the license holders will be carried out to identify areas of increased medical risk.
- b) In addition, there are certain medical conditions that might pose flight safety hazard. Therefore, such licence holders who suffer from these conditions are assessed as TMU (Temporary Medically Unfit). This data will be continually analysed to identify and determine any particular medical condition that has a significantly higher prevalence amongst the licence holders."

### **Way Forward**

Establishment of database and decide on corrective action plan along with the stakeholders through the health promotion activities

### 4.5.3 Over-The-Counter (OTC) drugs and self-medication

It has been established that prescription drugs medicines/ can affect the psychomotor as well as cognitive flying performance of flight crew. Therefore, only few medicines are permitted for the flight crew while on flying duties and that too under medical supervision. However, the use of Over-the-Counter (OTC) drugs or self-medication by the flight crew (which is consumed without medical supervision) may cause impairment in the pilot's flying performance and pose a significant threat to air safety. **The objective is to ensure that flight crew does not consume OTC drugs without medical supervision**. The fear of being rendered medically unfit for flying duties or not satisfying the medical requirements for their license is a major factor contributing to the prevalence of self-medication with OTC drugs to treat themselves. This barrier has to be eliminated through periodic education of flight crew, inculcating self-discipline, adequate supervision and a thorough pre-flight medical checks.

An organization may use following as measuring matrix:

- a. Educate flight crew against self-medication and encourage their flight crew to consult their company doctors or medical examiners if they are sick or feel ill.
- b. To capture the reasons and circumstances leading to consumption of OTC drugs without medical supervision, an organization should establish voluntary safety reporting/confidential reporting system.

### **Way Forward**

The confidential reports/feedback collected by the organization should be analyzed to determine ailments and OTC drugs being used and precipitating circumstances.

Establish database for commonly available OTC drugs for ailments the flight crew have/might engage in self-medication and develop effective preventive strategies.

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# **Safety Risk Controls**

### **5.1 Effective State Safety Oversight**



Indian aviation is in a state of continuous change and will become increasingly automated and far more complex. Safety oversight will be based on predictive and proactive methodologies.

A key focus for the DGCA during the period of this Safety Plan will continue to be on ensuring that it remains fit-for-purpose and continues to provide an appropriate and effective level of regulatory and safety

oversight that balances needs of the industry, travelling public and the international community.

The key safety objectives (SO9.1-9.4) and our proposed action plan are summarized below:

**Table 5.1-Key Safety Objectives** 

Safety objective(s)	Action	Stakeholder (s)	Target date
SO9.1: Establish and maintain appropriate	DGCA shall conduct periodic reviews of all regulations to ensure applicability and compliance with best practice	DGCA	On-going
regulatory framework and approach to	DGCA shall develop new regulations in consultation with relevant service providers	1. DGCA 2. Service providers	On-going
ensure effective oversight	DGCA shall increase the level of compliance with ICAO SARPs and the EI of the CEs at the National Level	DGCA	On-going
SO9.2: Comply with international safety standards	DGCA shall routinely assess itself against ICAO and other requirements to ensure ongoing compliance	DGCA	On-going
SO9.3: Ensuring qualified and technical	DGCA shall recruit, train and maintain a competent workforce to support regulatory oversight	DGCA	On-going
personnel	DGCA shall identify the training requirements to implement the necessary oversight mandate	DGCA	On-going
SO9.4: Prepare for transition for a risk based approach for regulatory oversight	DGCA shall establish necessary processes to ensure availability and quality of data to enable it to progressively transition to risk- based approach for regulatory oversight	1. DGCA 2. Service providers	On-going

### **5.2 Effective Safety Management System**



As part of State Safety Programme and National Aviation Safety Plan, major operators have developed their SPIs, associated SPTs and alert levels, which are congruent with the State SSP aggregate Safety Performance Indicators and are also pertinent with the service provider's aviation activities.

The revised CAR Section1, Series C, Part 1 on "Safety Management System" provides guidance to applicable service providers on the phase-wise implementation of SMS as per ICAO Doc 9859.

Based on the guidelines of ICAO Annex 19, DGCA has published SSP Circular 03 of 2017 which provides further guidance to operators in general aviation category on implementation of SMS. Operators are encouraged to carry out safety risk assessments for any major change viz. operations to new airport, induction of aircraft etc. For review of the safety risk assessments submitted by service provider, dedicated group has been set up in DGCA.

The safety objectives (SO9.5 and 9.6) are for 100% implementation of SMS by service providers.

The key safety objectives (SO9.5-9.6) and proposed action plan are summarized below:

**Table 5.2-Effective Safety Management Systems – Action Plan** 

Safety objective(s)	Action	Stakeholder(s)	Target date
SO9.5: Number of service providers that have completed the implementation of SMS (as a percent of the total number) i.e. scheduled operators, non-	DGCA shall formally assess the progress of each service provider and provide guidance in order to achieve full compliance		On-going
scheduled, MROs, aerodrome operators and ANS service providers	Turi comprission		
SO9.6: Number of other applicable service providers that have completed the implementation of SMS (as a percent of the total number) i.e. flying training and aircraft design & production organizations	DGCA shall provide all applicable service providers with initial guidance and follow-up with an assessment of their progress and provide additional direction as necessary	<ol> <li>DGCA</li> <li>Flying training and aircraft design &amp; production organizations</li> </ol>	On-going

## **5.3 Progressive Adoption of Aviation Safety Culture**



DGCA has adopted an appropriate safety culture, which has encouraged reporting and helped in reduce risk across the aviation sector which continues to be a major challenge.

Therefore, the safety objectives in this area (SO9.7 and 9.8), are aimed at progressing the development of a safety culture amongst all service

providers' staff, initially evidenced by increased reporting and a willingness to share more safety related information, and to develop a means of measuring the safety culture of an organization.

The key safety objectives (SO9.7-9.8) and proposed action plan are summarized below:

**Table 5.3-Aviation Safety Culture – Action Plan** 

Safety Objective(s)	Action	Stakeholder(s)	Target date
SO9.7: Service providers will develop	DGCA shall provide guidance to all service providers	DGCA	On-going
an appropriate organization safety culture	Service providers shall develop and implement safety promotion and plan for all staff	Service Providers	On-going
SO9.8: To be able to effectively measure safety culture maturity	a. DGCA, while working with other stakeholders shall develop a means to measure and assess safety culture maturity	DGCA	a. December, 2022
	b. ICAO checklist for assessment of safety culture will be used		b. On-going

The effectiveness of actions will be assessed by tracking the following SPIs:

Table 5.4 SPIs

SPI	Indicator
9.1	Number of MSRS received
9.2	Number of voluntary or confidential reports received through State Voluntary Reporting System

### **5.4 Safety Information Exchange**



The sharing and exchange of safety information is a prime component of State objectives. In order to enhance the sharing and exchange of information, DGCA communicates and disseminates safety information as well as safety analysis both internally and externally which identifies and mitigates safety risks.

Therefore, the final safety objective (SO9.9) is aimed at sharing and exchange of information which is already in place and included in DGCA Procedures Manual.

The protection of safety information is significant to the sharing and exchange of safety information initiatives, and the guidance related is included in DGCA Civil Aviation Requirements on "Safety Management System".

**Table 5.5-Sharing and Exchange of Information** 

Safety Objective(s)	Action	Stakeholder(s)	Target date
S09.9 Sharing and exchange of information	a) DGCA shall carry out internal training, communication and dissemination of safety information.		Ongoing
	b) DGCA shall carry out external training, communication and dissemination of safety information.		

**5.5** Safety Management System Implementation by Operators Following safety performance indicators (Table 5.6) are being monitored.

Table 5.6 SPIs

SPI	Indicator
10.1	Number of service providers that are yet to complete the implementation of Phase- I of SMS as per CAR Section 1, Series C, Part I
10.2	Number of service providers that are yet to complete the implementation of Phase- II of SMS as per CAR Section 1, Series C, Part I
10.3	Number of service providers that have completed the implementation of Phase- III of SMS as per CAR Section 1, Series C, Part I
10.4	Number of service providers that have completed the implementation of Phase- IV of SMS as per CAR Section 1, Series C, Part I

# Glossary

Acronym	Definition
ACAS	Airborne Collision Avoidance System
AERD	Aerodrome Operators
AFM	Airplane Flight Manual
AIRPROX	Air Proximity incident
ALAR	Approach and Landing Accidents Reduction
ALoSP	Accepted Level of Safety Performance
ANSP	Air Navigation Service Provider
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATCO	Air Traffic Control Officers
CAO	Commercial Aeroplane Operators
CAR	Civil Aviation Requirement
CBT	Computer Based Training
CE	Critical Element
CFIT	Controlled Flight Into Terrain
СНО	Commercial Helicopter Operators
CRM	Crew Resource Management
DGCA	Directorate General of Civil Aviation
EGPWS	Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
EI	Effective Implementation
GASP	Global Aviation Safety Plan (ICAO)
GPWS	Ground Proximity Warning System
GSE	Ground Support Equipment
HRCs	High Risk Categories
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
LVP	Low Visibility Procedure
MET	Meteorology
MSRS	Mandatory Safety Reporting System
MRO	Maintenance Repair and Overhaul

Acronym	Definition
MSA	Minimum Safe Altitude
MSAWS	Minimum Safe Altitude Warning System
NASP	National Aviation Safety Plan
RA	Resolution Advisory
RASP-APAC	Regional Aviation Safety Plan- Asia Pacific
RFM	Rotary Flight Manual
RPAS	Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
RT	Radio Telephony
SARPs	ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
SEIs	Safety Enhancement Initiatives
SMS	Safety Management System
SO	Safety Objective
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SPIs	Safety Performance Indicators
SPTs	Safety Performance Targets
SSFDR	Solid State Flight Data Recorder
SSP	State Safety Programme
TCAS	Traffic Collision Avoidance System
UIN	Unique Identification Number
VFR	Visual Flight Rules

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